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Preface
inimum wages, in various forms, exist in more than 90 percent of the 
International Labour organization’s (ILO) member States. Minimum wage 
systems aim to protect workers against unduly low pay, helping to ensure 
a just and equitable share of the fruits of progress to all, and a minimum living wage 
to all who are employed and in need of such protection. 
The Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131) and the accompanying 
Recommendation No. 135, include important principles relating to factors to be 
considered during the minimum wage setting process, in including the needs of 
workers and their families as well as other social and economic considerations, such 
ination and productivity. A further key principle is that it should be participatory 
and tripartite, to ensure the representation of those involved in the decision. 
Historically the purpose of minimum wages has evolved from a policy tool to be used 
selected in a few low-wage sectors to an instrument of universal social protection 
with broader coverage. 
In line with the global trends, Viet Nam has seen major improvements in its minimum 
wage policy and system in recent years. Before 2012, Viet Nam’s had a two tier system 
with diering minimum wage rates for domestic enterprises and foreign enterprises, 
which were xed by the government. The establishment of the tripartite National 
Wage Council in 2013 has transformed Viet Nam’s minimum wage system by 
merging two minimum wage rates into a single rate with regional dierentiation as 
well as providing for tripartite participation in developing minimum wage 
recommendations.
This working paper is timely, as there is a growing need to examine the impact of 
minimum wages on the labour market. In this paper, the authors (Henrik Hansen, 
John Rand and Nina Torm) highlight the impact of minimum wage changes in the 
distribution of wages in the informal and other sectors. In this respect, an 
improvement in income distribution for a large proportion of the employed 
population is emerging. However, due to some structural characteristics in the rural 
sector as well in household production, the “light-house” eect of the minimum 
wage that is evident in minimum wages in other developing countries, apply here 
only for those in the upper layer of the informal sector.
M
With the publication of the working paper, the ILO seeks to continue to contribute to 
policy discussion and debate about the continuous improvement of the minimum 
wage xing process, which should be based on a regular examination of impact of 
minimum wages on jobs, wage levels and wage distribution in Viet Nam’s labour 
market.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
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Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
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reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
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reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
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found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
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1  Introduction
ne of the intended purposes of minimum wages is to improve the economic 
conditions of those at the bottom of the wage distribution thereby 
reducing both inequality and the number of working poor.1 In spite of a 
large literature, the question of whether minimum wage adjustments actually 
reduces wage inequality remain controversial and empirically ambiguous, 
depending on the country context including the way in which minimum wage policy 
is carried-out.
In Viet Nam, minimum wage policies changed markedly in the mid-1990s as part of 
the country’s ongoing market reforms and since then Viet Nam has had several 
coexisting minimum wage rates varying across location and economic sector.2 
Minimum wage rates have typically been adjusted January 1st every year after 
negotiations between the government and the labour market associations during 
the fall the previous year whereby minimum wage changes have typically reected 
both changes in needs as well as expected changes in economic capacity. However, 
in 2012 the dierent minimum wage rates across the economic sectors were aligned 
leading to a considerable non-negotiated increase in the minimum wage for workers 
in formal non-state enterprises and state enterprises. As a result the ratio of 
minimum wages to average wages (the Kaitz index) rose from about 41 per cent in 
2011 to 55 per cent in 2013.
Based on data from the Vietnamese Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2011-2013, we use this 
alignment to estimate the impact of the minimum wage legislation on wage 
inequality. We follow Lee (1999) in estimating the eect of the minimum wage on the 
shape of local wage distributions. These local wage distributions are dened over 
provinces, economic sectors, and time in accordance with the dierent minimum 
mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
1  According to the ILO, the minimum wage is understood to mean “the minimum sum payable to a 
worker for work performed or services rendered, within a given period, whether calculated on the basis 
of time or output, which may not be reduced either by individual or collective agreement, which is 
guaranteed by law and which may be xed in such a way as to cover the minimum needs of the worker 
and his or her family, in the light of national economic and social conditions” (ILO, 1992).
2  Viet Nam classies all economic activities including both private and public production as well as 
public administration into sectors according to ownership of the entity. The main sectors are non-state, 
state and foreign.
wage levels in Viet Nam in 2011, such that each local wage distribution can be 
associated with a single minimum wage level and thus a single “eective minimum 
wage” dened as the (log of ) the ratio of the minimum real wage to the median real 
wage. Our regression results indicate that the minimum wage has a both statistically 
and economically signicant impact on the lower tail of the local wage distributions 
in the formal sectors, thereby reducing local wage inequality. In contrast, the 
minimum wage changes do not appear to have had any impact on the lower wages 
in the informal sectors (agriculture and household production). Instead, we nd a 
signicant and substantial impact on the upper tail of the local wage distributions in 
the informal  sectors.
With these conicting results, the overall impact of the minimum wage changes on 
the national Vietnamese wage distribution could go either way. Therefore, we 
quantify the eect of the changes by computing counterfactual individual wages to 
construct counterfactual national wage distributions. The counterfactual 
distributions indicate that the minimum wage changes reduced wage inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coecient and the coecient of variation, both in the formal 
sector and for Vietnamese wage workers as a whole, while wage inequality increased 
in the informal sectors. Zooming in on the lower part of the wage distribution our 
results indicate that the 10/50 wage ratio would have been 5-7 percentage points 
lower in the absence of minimum wage changes from 2011 onwards. For workers in 
the formal sector the impact on the 10/50 wage ratio was probably as much as 7-10 
percentage points increase. We conclude that in Viet Nam the minimum wage 
legislations do appear to decrease wage inequality.      
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the relevant 
minimum wage literature. In Section 3, we discuss the context of Vietnamese 
minimum wage legislation and recent adjustments as analysed in the paper. In 
Section 4, we introduce and summarize the LFS data. The main results are presented 
in Section 5 following a detailed description of the methodology and econometric 
approach applied including the underlying identifying assumptions. Finally, Section 
6 provides concluding remarks. 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
O
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
12 The impact of minimum wage adjustments on Vietnamese wage inequality
ne of the intended purposes of minimum wages is to improve the economic 
conditions of those at the bottom of the wage distribution thereby 
reducing both inequality and the number of working poor.1 In spite of a 
large literature, the question of whether minimum wage adjustments actually 
reduces wage inequality remain controversial and empirically ambiguous, 
depending on the country context including the way in which minimum wage policy 
is carried-out.
In Viet Nam, minimum wage policies changed markedly in the mid-1990s as part of 
the country’s ongoing market reforms and since then Viet Nam has had several 
coexisting minimum wage rates varying across location and economic sector.2 
Minimum wage rates have typically been adjusted January 1st every year after 
negotiations between the government and the labour market associations during 
the fall the previous year whereby minimum wage changes have typically reected 
both changes in needs as well as expected changes in economic capacity. However, 
in 2012 the dierent minimum wage rates across the economic sectors were aligned 
leading to a considerable non-negotiated increase in the minimum wage for workers 
in formal non-state enterprises and state enterprises. As a result the ratio of 
minimum wages to average wages (the Kaitz index) rose from about 41 per cent in 
2011 to 55 per cent in 2013.
Based on data from the Vietnamese Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2011-2013, we use this 
alignment to estimate the impact of the minimum wage legislation on wage 
inequality. We follow Lee (1999) in estimating the eect of the minimum wage on the 
shape of local wage distributions. These local wage distributions are dened over 
provinces, economic sectors, and time in accordance with the dierent minimum 
mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
wage levels in Viet Nam in 2011, such that each local wage distribution can be 
associated with a single minimum wage level and thus a single “eective minimum 
wage” dened as the (log of ) the ratio of the minimum real wage to the median real 
wage. Our regression results indicate that the minimum wage has a both statistically 
and economically signicant impact on the lower tail of the local wage distributions 
in the formal sectors, thereby reducing local wage inequality. In contrast, the 
minimum wage changes do not appear to have had any impact on the lower wages 
in the informal sectors (agriculture and household production). Instead, we nd a 
signicant and substantial impact on the upper tail of the local wage distributions in 
the informal  sectors.
With these conicting results, the overall impact of the minimum wage changes on 
the national Vietnamese wage distribution could go either way. Therefore, we 
quantify the eect of the changes by computing counterfactual individual wages to 
construct counterfactual national wage distributions. The counterfactual 
distributions indicate that the minimum wage changes reduced wage inequality, as 
measured by the Gini coecient and the coecient of variation, both in the formal 
sector and for Vietnamese wage workers as a whole, while wage inequality increased 
in the informal sectors. Zooming in on the lower part of the wage distribution our 
results indicate that the 10/50 wage ratio would have been 5-7 percentage points 
lower in the absence of minimum wage changes from 2011 onwards. For workers in 
the formal sector the impact on the 10/50 wage ratio was probably as much as 7-10 
percentage points increase. We conclude that in Viet Nam the minimum wage 
legislations do appear to decrease wage inequality.      
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the relevant 
minimum wage literature. In Section 3, we discuss the context of Vietnamese 
minimum wage legislation and recent adjustments as analysed in the paper. In 
Section 4, we introduce and summarize the LFS data. The main results are presented 
in Section 5 following a detailed description of the methodology and econometric 
approach applied including the underlying identifying assumptions. Finally, Section 
6 provides concluding remarks. 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
3   In this section we focus on studies that are considered directly relevant for our empirical analysis 
rather than reporting the numerous and extremely mixed ndings of the large body of work on 
minimum wages.
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
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reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
4   Non-compliance, however, is not restricted to developing countries. For instance, Weil (2005) 
documents that around 27 per cent of workers are paid less than the minimum-wage rate in the US. 
5   Until recently, there was a comparative dearth of literature analysing the impact of minimum wage 
policies in low-income countries. Yet, in a comprehensive review of developing country work, Betcher-
man (2015) illustrates the varying results from modest negative, to insignicant or small positive 
impacts on aggregate employment, though with young workers consistently being more likely to be 
negatively aected. In terms of wages, the overall ndings are positive (in some cases with knock-on-ef-
fects in the informal sector) and likewise for the distribution of earnings and reduction of poverty, 
whereas for productivity there is more ambiguity, due partly to the lack of developing country studies 
in this area. See Freeman (2009) for an earlier review of labour regulation employment eects in 
developing countries.
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
6   Lemos (2007) also nds a strong compression in the wage distribution for both private and public 
sector workers with no adverse employment eects on the more vulnerable segment of the workforce 
(women, lower educated and teenagers).
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
7   As such, the minimum wage rise is less likely to be perceived by employers as longer-lasting increases 
in the cost of low-wage labour. Neumark and Wascher (2007) also point to the importance of specifying 
the minimum wage in real or relative terms, especially in longer samples. 
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
3  The Vietnamese context
n Viet Nam, the concept of the minimum wage goes back to 1946.8  Yet, it was only 
ocially dened in 1995 with the introduction of the Labour Code: “the minimum 
wage is the lowest wage xed based on the cost of living in order to ensure 
compensation for workers doing the simplest job in normal working conditions and 
enabling them to reproduce their labour”. The basic idea remains more or less the 
same in the most recent version of the Labour Code (2012): “the minimum wage is 
the lowest rate that is paid to the employee who performs the simplest work in the 
normal working conditions and that must ensure the minimal living needs of the 
employees and their families”. 9 The so-called common minimum wage is not an 
actual minimum wage in the classical sense in that it does not determine a wage 
oor. However, it forms the basis for calculating; (a) wage scales for government sta 
and state sector workers; (b) wage scales for the payment of social insurance, 
unemployment insurance and health insurance for workers of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs); (c) allowances for redundant workers due to the restructuring of 
SOEs; (d) pensions, allowances for veterans, and other social transfers. As such, the 
minimum wage depends largely on the capacity of the Government budget.
In terms of the actual process of setting the regional minimum wage, this has 
traditionally been Government-led based on separate and indirect consultations 
between the Government and the dierent industrial relation parties, albeit with 
limited representation of the latter. More specically and as specied in the 
corresponding decrees, MoLISA (The Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social 
Aairs) has assumed the prime responsibility coordinating with the VGCL (Viet Nam 
General Confederation of Labour), the VCCI (Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry), concerned ministries, agencies and provincial-level People’s Committees 
in informing employees and employers of the region-based minimum wage levels. 
MoLISA has taken the lead in inspecting and ensuring compliance and decisions on 
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reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
8   See Hansen et al. (2014) for a more complete historic account of minimum wage development in Viet 
Nam.
9   In accordance with the recommendations of Viet Nam nutrition institute (2008), the minimum 
sucient expenditure level, as calculated from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards Survey 
(VHLSS) (2008), is based on the value of food and non-food consumption items required to ensure 2300 
kcal/day for an adult and 1600 kcal/day for a child (ILSSA, 2012). However, recent reports point out that 
the minimum wage level is always below the sucient minimum daily expenditure level (MoLISA, 
2011). (National Wage Council, 2014).
the adjustment of the region-based minimum wage. The authorization for 
procedures of adjusting regions has (in theory) been conducted at the province level, 
yet in practice this has not been done in an agreeable manner (MoLISA, 2011).
The minimum wage setting process, which generally takes place on an annual basis 
in the late fall, has traditionally played an important role in the Vietnamese labour 
market because the minimum level represents the base according to which the wage 
level and thus the social insurance contributions of dierent workers are calculated. 
Specically, rms must pay the government 17 per cent of a formal worker’s wage as 
social insurance. Since actual wages are often misreported, the social security 
administration uses the minimum wage as a basis for calculating the compulsory 
social insurance contribution by rms. Within this set-up, the statutory minimum 
wage replaces independent and additional collective bargaining, reecting the fact 
that unions are limited in their capacity to organize and carry out collective 
bargaining in rms or at the industry level. As alluded to above, in the state sector, 
wages remain tied to the base minimum wage, yet less so in the domestic private 
sector as the market economy is maturing.
Traditionally, minimum wage rates have been set at dierent levels for dierent 
economic sectors.10 Minimum wages only apply for registered enterprises and public 
administration. Hence, the relevant economic sectors are State (consisting of the 
public sector and state owned enterprises), Private (private enterprises with no 
foreign ownership), and Foreign investment (enterprises with partly foreign 
ownership). According to GSO (2014), about 2/3 of the Vietnamese wage workers are 
directly covered by the minimum wage regulations.
In 2012 the minimum wage rates were aligned with the intention of overcoming 
discrimination between workers from private and foreign investment companies, 
resulting in a steep rise in the minimum wage for private companies.11 Regional 
variation in minimum wages still remains, though. The regional dierences are aimed 
at ensuring the purchasing power of the minimum wage for the same commodity at 
dierent prices.12 However, in practice, the criteria used for regional minimum wage 
variations are opaque, in turn rendering the adjustment process inconsistent. 
Moreover, implementation is complicated by the fact that the regional division is 
based on administrative units whereby neighbouring locations with very similar 
characteristics may apply dierent regional minimum wages.
From 2011 to 2012 the nominal minimum wage for workers in private enterprises 
increased by as much as 50-75 per cent (depending on the region), equivalent to an 
increase of 34-57 per cent in real terms. The following year (2012 to 2013), the rise 
was less dramatic at 15-17 per cent in nominal terms, equivalent to 9-12 per cent in 
real terms (see Table 1). The minimum to average wage ratio (the Kaitz index) 
calculated at the district level increased from 38 per cent in 2011 to 54 per cent in 
2013 while the minimum to median wage ratio rose from 44 per cent to 60 per cent, 
indicating a substantial increase in the “bite” of the minimum wage.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
n Viet Nam, the concept of the minimum wage goes back to 1946.8  Yet, it was only 
ocially dened in 1995 with the introduction of the Labour Code: “the minimum 
wage is the lowest wage xed based on the cost of living in order to ensure 
compensation for workers doing the simplest job in normal working conditions and 
enabling them to reproduce their labour”. The basic idea remains more or less the 
same in the most recent version of the Labour Code (2012): “the minimum wage is 
the lowest rate that is paid to the employee who performs the simplest work in the 
normal working conditions and that must ensure the minimal living needs of the 
employees and their families”. 9 The so-called common minimum wage is not an 
actual minimum wage in the classical sense in that it does not determine a wage 
oor. However, it forms the basis for calculating; (a) wage scales for government sta 
and state sector workers; (b) wage scales for the payment of social insurance, 
unemployment insurance and health insurance for workers of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs); (c) allowances for redundant workers due to the restructuring of 
SOEs; (d) pensions, allowances for veterans, and other social transfers. As such, the 
minimum wage depends largely on the capacity of the Government budget.
In terms of the actual process of setting the regional minimum wage, this has 
traditionally been Government-led based on separate and indirect consultations 
between the Government and the dierent industrial relation parties, albeit with 
limited representation of the latter. More specically and as specied in the 
corresponding decrees, MoLISA (The Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social 
Aairs) has assumed the prime responsibility coordinating with the VGCL (Viet Nam 
General Confederation of Labour), the VCCI (Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry), concerned ministries, agencies and provincial-level People’s Committees 
in informing employees and employers of the region-based minimum wage levels. 
MoLISA has taken the lead in inspecting and ensuring compliance and decisions on 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
10   Viet Nam has a classication of economic sectors broadly according to ownership. The classication 
has three main sectors: State, Non-state, and Foreign investment. The Non-state sector is further divided 
into four sub-sectors: (i) Agriculture, forestry, shery, household; (ii) Household of individual production; 
(iii) Collective and (iv) Private. 
11   In fact, the 2012 minimum wage came into eect already on 1/10/2011.
12   The regional variation in minimum wages is based on several criteria including the comparable price 
index, GDP per capita, the share of poor households, consumption levels of dierent types of commodi-
ties; the average wage levels in dierent types of enterprises; revenue per capita and the share of 
wage-earners (MoLISA, 2011).
the adjustment of the region-based minimum wage. The authorization for 
procedures of adjusting regions has (in theory) been conducted at the province level, 
yet in practice this has not been done in an agreeable manner (MoLISA, 2011).
The minimum wage setting process, which generally takes place on an annual basis 
in the late fall, has traditionally played an important role in the Vietnamese labour 
market because the minimum level represents the base according to which the wage 
level and thus the social insurance contributions of dierent workers are calculated. 
Specically, rms must pay the government 17 per cent of a formal worker’s wage as 
social insurance. Since actual wages are often misreported, the social security 
administration uses the minimum wage as a basis for calculating the compulsory 
social insurance contribution by rms. Within this set-up, the statutory minimum 
wage replaces independent and additional collective bargaining, reecting the fact 
that unions are limited in their capacity to organize and carry out collective 
bargaining in rms or at the industry level. As alluded to above, in the state sector, 
wages remain tied to the base minimum wage, yet less so in the domestic private 
sector as the market economy is maturing.
Traditionally, minimum wage rates have been set at dierent levels for dierent 
economic sectors.10 Minimum wages only apply for registered enterprises and public 
administration. Hence, the relevant economic sectors are State (consisting of the 
public sector and state owned enterprises), Private (private enterprises with no 
foreign ownership), and Foreign investment (enterprises with partly foreign 
ownership). According to GSO (2014), about 2/3 of the Vietnamese wage workers are 
directly covered by the minimum wage regulations.
In 2012 the minimum wage rates were aligned with the intention of overcoming 
discrimination between workers from private and foreign investment companies, 
resulting in a steep rise in the minimum wage for private companies.11 Regional 
variation in minimum wages still remains, though. The regional dierences are aimed 
at ensuring the purchasing power of the minimum wage for the same commodity at 
dierent prices.12 However, in practice, the criteria used for regional minimum wage 
variations are opaque, in turn rendering the adjustment process inconsistent. 
Moreover, implementation is complicated by the fact that the regional division is 
based on administrative units whereby neighbouring locations with very similar 
characteristics may apply dierent regional minimum wages.
From 2011 to 2012 the nominal minimum wage for workers in private enterprises 
increased by as much as 50-75 per cent (depending on the region), equivalent to an 
increase of 34-57 per cent in real terms. The following year (2012 to 2013), the rise 
was less dramatic at 15-17 per cent in nominal terms, equivalent to 9-12 per cent in 
real terms (see Table 1). The minimum to average wage ratio (the Kaitz index) 
calculated at the district level increased from 38 per cent in 2011 to 54 per cent in 
2013 while the minimum to median wage ratio rose from 44 per cent to 60 per cent, 
indicating a substantial increase in the “bite” of the minimum wage.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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mpirical studies of the eects of minimum wage adjustments on labour 
market outcomes have until recently focused mostly on industrialized 
countries (especially the UK and the US) within a competitive labour market 
framework, according to which a minimum wage imposed above the market 
equilibrium leads to higher average wages and a decrease in employment.3 Recent 
reviews are generally not sympathetic to this standard neoclassical interpretation of 
minimum wage implications. For instance, assessing alternative research designs in 
US-based studies Allegretto et al. (2013) nd only modest employment eects 
related to minimum wage changes. In terms of wages, comprehensive meta-analyses 
of US studies by Belman and Wolfson (2014), and Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) 
nd that minimum wages serve to increase the earnings of those at the bottom of 
the income distribution and thereby reduce wage inequality. 
Methodologically, most existing studies rely on a “dierential impact approach” 
comparing groups that are more or less aected (high versus low earners), due either 
to their geographical location and/or position in the wage distribution. In the case of 
the UK, for instance, Stewart (2002; 2004), applies a dierence-in-dierence 
approach using individual level panel data from Labour Force Surveys (LFS) when he 
examines the bite of the multilevel minimum wage. The results reveal some impact 
on the wage distributions varying by geographical areas, yet show little evidence of 
any employment eect on low-wage workers. 
In the US, Lee (1999) uses variation in the eective minimum wage across regions to 
show that during the 1980s the declining real minimum wage accounted for the vast 
majority of the growing wage gap between the 10th and 50th percentile. Similarly, a 
more recent study by Slonimczyk and Skott (2012) nds that the subsequent increase 
in federal minimum wages led to decreasing wage inequality and that both total and 
low skilled employment increased. Addressing concerns of measurement error 
biases in previous studies, in particular in Lee (1999), Autor et al. (2016) use an 
instrumental variable approach to show that the equalizing eect of minimum 
wages in the lower half of the wage distribution is much smaller than previously 
found. The authors also address the important issue of whether minimum wages 
spill-over to the upper part of the distribution and they convincingly argue that the 
estimated spill-over eects are due to measurement error. In sum, the most widely 
cited studies of countries from the Global North seem to display evidence in favour 
of an equalizing eect of minimum wage changes.
The analysis of minimum wage eects is generally more complex in developing 
countries characterized by heterogeneous labour markets, large informal sectors 
and limited enforcement and compliance with minimum wage regulations.4 
Nevertheless, such analyses may be particularly important in less advanced 
economies, where minimum wages are likely to aect a larger proportion of a 
typically more vulnerable workforce.5  Some, for example Hamermesh (1994), argue 
that a Harris-Todaro-type two-sector model comprising (i) a formal sector where 
coverage is complete and enforcement is present and (ii) an informal sector in which 
coverage and enforcement are rare and incomplete provides a more suitable 
framework for analysing minimum wages in a developing country context. In this 
setting, the imposition of a minimum wage may, through decreasing the amount of 
labour absorbed in the formal sector, lead to a reallocation of workers to the informal 
sector, in turn lowering wages in this sector (Harrison and Leamer, 1997). Focusing on 
low-income countries and covering a range of labour regulations Nataraj et al. (2012) 
conclude that the evidence points to negative eects of regulations on formal 
employment, and a compensating positive eect on informal employment. The 
eect on the overall employment (and unemployment) rate is ambiguous. Other 
studies, as outlined below, have shown that minimum wages in the formal sector 
may also have positive wage eects on the informal part of the economy. Thus, 
labour market outcomes of a minimum wage adjustment may dier depending on 
the theoretical framework adopted. Moreover, even in a neoclassical model, the 
minimum wage eect on any given category of workers will depend on the elasticity 
of substitution across dierent worker types. One may even nd that minimum wage 
increases encourage substitution of skilled for unskilled workers (Aaronson and 
French, 2007), resulting in improved productivity yet without causing an overall 
change in employment. 
In spite of the challenges, there is a growing number of minimum wage related 
studies from developing and emerging economies and until now, Latin America 
claims the vast majority. Based on Colombian household data linking individuals 
across consecutive quarters, Maloney and Núñez (2004) document an impact on the 
wage distribution both in the vicinity of the minimum wage and higher up the wage 
distribution (a numeraire eect), with signicant dis-employment eects. Examining 
the multiple minimum wage levels in Costa Rica Gindling and Terell (2007) analyse 
repeated cross-sections of individual (household) data from 1988-2000 and show 
that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage reduces employment in the 
covered sector by around 1 per cent while the number of hours worked decreases by 
0.6 per cent. The eect is more severe in the lower half of the skill distribution. Based 
on data from the Brazilian Monthly Employment Survey 1982-2004 Lemos (2004, 
2005, 2007 and 2009) uses panel data techniques in a variety of set-ups. The results 
are mixed, but overall there is little evidence of adverse employment eects (in both 
the formal and informal sector) due to minimum wage adjustments. For instance, 
Lemos (2009) nds that contrary to the theoretical prediction of the two-sector 
model, minimum wages serve to increase salaries in the low end of the wage 
distribution in both the formal and the informal sector, indicating that formal sector 
regulation has spill-over eects to the latter segment – the so-called lighthouse 
eect.6 Similarly, using Argentinian household survey data and exploiting 
geographical variation and a similar (dierence-in-dierence) methodology to 
Stewart (2002), Khamis (2013) nds that minimum wages have a stronger wage 
eect in the informal compared with the formal sector. Also documenting the 
existence of knock-on eects, Bosch and Manacorda (2010) nd that the decrease in 
the real minimum wage in Mexico during the 1990’s explains the rising wage 
inequality, especially in the lower part of the wage distribution. 
Studies of countries on the African continent remain more limited, yet using the 1998 
LFS in Kenya Andalón and Pagés (2009) nd evidence that minimum wages are 
positively associated with the wages of low-educated workers and women and 
thereby serve to reduce the earnings gap. Focusing on the eects of the 2002 South 
African minimum wage legislation for domestic workers, Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2012) apply a dierence-in-dierence method to LFS data, to show that domestic 
worker wages increased by 13-15 per cent in the 16 months following the 
implementation of the law. Also on South Africa, Bhorat et al. (2013) develop a 
compliance violation index and show that both the level and depth of 
non-compliance are important in quantifying violation of minimum wage 
legislation, illustrating the importance of sector variation in compliance. In sum then, 
studies from Latin America and Africa reveal rather modest adverse employment 
eects, if any, and document the potential of minimum wages to reduce wage 
inequality, making regulations a viable anti-poverty instrument in these settings.
Turning to Asia, a series of studies have focused on the implications of the doubling 
of the real minimum wage during the early 1990s in Indonesia, using both rm and 
worker data. Based on the 1993 LFS (complemented with a national wage survey), 
Rama (2001) shows that the steep rise in the Indonesian minimum wage led to a 5-15 
per cent increase in average wages, and a modest fall in employment by less than 5 
per cent. Also on Indonesia, Magruder (2013) uses three waves of panel family life 
surveys and a combination of dierence-in-dierence and spatial regression 
discontinuity design to show that the doubling of the minimum wage led to a 10 per 
cent increase in wages and a fall in self-employment by 10-20 per cent. Moreover, 
quantile regressions reveal that the minimum wage rise had a positive wage eect, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution where wages rose by 150-160 per cent. 
Although, the analysis is based on a relatively small sample, the ndings are in line 
with the “big-push model”. In the case of Thailand, Del Carpio et al. (2014) apply a 
standard dierence-in-dierence estimator to LFS data making use of the provincial 
variation in the wage oor to show that during 1998-2010 minimum wage increases 
had positive eects on individual wages. Observed dierences in magnitude 
between women and younger workers as well as across education categories, point 
to the importance of including standard socio-economic characteristics. In terms of 
employment status, the study nds no evidence in favour of workers being pushed 
into the informal sector due to wage increases. Again, the Asia region reveal positive 
wage results across all segments of the wage distribution and an increased 
formalization of the workforce, as opposed to formal workers being “crowded-out” to 
the informal sector. 
Finally, focusing on Viet Nam, Nguyen (2010) applies dierence-in-dierence and 
propensity score matching to data from the Viet Nam Household Living Standards 
Survey (VHLSS) 2004 and 2006 to measure the impact of the 2005 minimum wage 
adjustment on wages, expenditure and employment. Nguyen nds evidence of a 
n Viet Nam, the concept of the minimum wage goes back to 1946.8  Yet, it was only 
ocially dened in 1995 with the introduction of the Labour Code: “the minimum 
wage is the lowest wage xed based on the cost of living in order to ensure 
compensation for workers doing the simplest job in normal working conditions and 
enabling them to reproduce their labour”. The basic idea remains more or less the 
same in the most recent version of the Labour Code (2012): “the minimum wage is 
the lowest rate that is paid to the employee who performs the simplest work in the 
normal working conditions and that must ensure the minimal living needs of the 
employees and their families”. 9 The so-called common minimum wage is not an 
actual minimum wage in the classical sense in that it does not determine a wage 
oor. However, it forms the basis for calculating; (a) wage scales for government sta 
and state sector workers; (b) wage scales for the payment of social insurance, 
unemployment insurance and health insurance for workers of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs); (c) allowances for redundant workers due to the restructuring of 
SOEs; (d) pensions, allowances for veterans, and other social transfers. As such, the 
minimum wage depends largely on the capacity of the Government budget.
In terms of the actual process of setting the regional minimum wage, this has 
traditionally been Government-led based on separate and indirect consultations 
between the Government and the dierent industrial relation parties, albeit with 
limited representation of the latter. More specically and as specied in the 
corresponding decrees, MoLISA (The Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social 
Aairs) has assumed the prime responsibility coordinating with the VGCL (Viet Nam 
General Confederation of Labour), the VCCI (Viet Nam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry), concerned ministries, agencies and provincial-level People’s Committees 
in informing employees and employers of the region-based minimum wage levels. 
MoLISA has taken the lead in inspecting and ensuring compliance and decisions on 
reduction in formal sector employment but no signicant impact on wages, which 
could be related to the fact that during the period of analysis the minimum wage did 
not vary by region and also real minimum wages hardly increased.7 In a more recent 
study, using the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (VES) from 2008-2010 Nguyen (2014) 
nds that minimum wage increases are associated with a small increase in average 
wages and a slight reduction in employment, yet the results are uninformative about 
the eect on workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Also based on VES, 
Hansen et al. (2014) use a triple-dierence approach to reveal dierences in wage 
responses for high and low wage rms suggesting that minimum wage adjustments 
aect the wage distribution.
13   Some studies stress the need to consider the mechanism through which the minimum wage is 
determined and uses cross-country heterogeneity in regime type to explain variations in minimum 
wage levels. For instance, Boeri (2012) nds that the minimum wage level is generally lower in countries 
where it is determined unilaterally by the Government compared with being the outcome of 
negotiations between unions and employers associations. 
the adjustment of the region-based minimum wage. The authorization for 
procedures of adjusting regions has (in theory) been conducted at the province level, 
yet in practice this has not been done in an agreeable manner (MoLISA, 2011).
The minimum wage setting process, which generally takes place on an annual basis 
in the late fall, has traditionally played an important role in the Vietnamese labour 
market because the minimum level represents the base according to which the wage 
level and thus the social insurance contributions of dierent workers are calculated. 
Specically, rms must pay the government 17 per cent of a formal worker’s wage as 
social insurance. Since actual wages are often misreported, the social security 
administration uses the minimum wage as a basis for calculating the compulsory 
social insurance contribution by rms. Within this set-up, the statutory minimum 
wage replaces independent and additional collective bargaining, reecting the fact 
that unions are limited in their capacity to organize and carry out collective 
bargaining in rms or at the industry level. As alluded to above, in the state sector, 
wages remain tied to the base minimum wage, yet less so in the domestic private 
sector as the market economy is maturing.
Traditionally, minimum wage rates have been set at dierent levels for dierent 
economic sectors.10 Minimum wages only apply for registered enterprises and public 
administration. Hence, the relevant economic sectors are State (consisting of the 
public sector and state owned enterprises), Private (private enterprises with no 
foreign ownership), and Foreign investment (enterprises with partly foreign 
ownership). According to GSO (2014), about 2/3 of the Vietnamese wage workers are 
directly covered by the minimum wage regulations.
In 2012 the minimum wage rates were aligned with the intention of overcoming 
discrimination between workers from private and foreign investment companies, 
resulting in a steep rise in the minimum wage for private companies.11 Regional 
variation in minimum wages still remains, though. The regional dierences are aimed 
at ensuring the purchasing power of the minimum wage for the same commodity at 
dierent prices.12 However, in practice, the criteria used for regional minimum wage 
variations are opaque, in turn rendering the adjustment process inconsistent. 
Moreover, implementation is complicated by the fact that the regional division is 
based on administrative units whereby neighbouring locations with very similar 
characteristics may apply dierent regional minimum wages.
From 2011 to 2012 the nominal minimum wage for workers in private enterprises 
increased by as much as 50-75 per cent (depending on the region), equivalent to an 
increase of 34-57 per cent in real terms. The following year (2012 to 2013), the rise 
was less dramatic at 15-17 per cent in nominal terms, equivalent to 9-12 per cent in 
real terms (see Table 1). The minimum to average wage ratio (the Kaitz index) 
calculated at the district level increased from 38 per cent in 2011 to 54 per cent in 
2013 while the minimum to median wage ratio rose from 44 per cent to 60 per cent, 
indicating a substantial increase in the “bite” of the minimum wage.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
Table 1: Minimum wages, by year, ownership type and region
Note: Wages are in 1,000 VND per month. Real wages have been deated using the CPI index (base year=2010)
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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14   Especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are seldom inspected (see CIEM, 2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 and 2014). At the same time, SMEs are more likely to nd minimum wages binding, due to the 
positive relationship between rm size and wages found in Viet Nam and generally in the literature, see 
Oi and Idson (1999) and Söderbom et al. (2005).
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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4  Minimum wages and local wage distributions
4.1. The shape of local wage distributions and the impact of minimum 
wages
In the seminal paper describing the impact of minimum wages on the wage 
distributions across the US states, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) assume that 
the minimum wage has no spill-over eect to wages above the minimum wage level. 
By this assumption, the minimum wage can only aect the lower left tail of the 
distributions, and the wage distributions are expected to have sharp discontinuity 
points at the level of the minimum wage. Lee (1999) modies this restrictive 
identifying assumption by supposing, instead, that the minimum wage has no 
impact on the median wage and above, but only on wages below the median. Bosch 
and Manacorda (2010) use the same identifying assumption for wage distributions in 
Mexico, although they modify the assumption to state that the 70th percentile of the 
distributions are unaected by minimum wage changes.
For Viet Nam we cannot assume that high wages (say, the median wage and above) 
are unaected by minimum wage changes. The reason is that the minimum wage for 
the state sector determines not only the lowest wages but also higher wages 
because remunerations are set as multiplicative mark-ups on the minimum wage. 
Thus, we expect changes in the minimum wage in the state sector to automatically 
lead to (close to) proportional changes in almost all wages in the sector. Further, 
because of the size of the state sector in Viet Nam the wage setting in that sector is 
likely to have substantial spill-over eects to the other economic sectors, whereby 
even high wage employees in non-state enterprises may be aected by minimum 
wage changes in the state sector.
As we show below, under certain assumptions about the local wage distributions, 
the wage distribution regressions in Lee (1999), Bosch and Manacorda (2010) and 
Autor et al. (2016) actually allow for minimum wage eects across the whole wage 
distribution. We illustrate this by being very explicit in the formulation of the 
observed and the latent wage distributions (the distributions that would have 
prevailed without the changes in the minimum wages) and we make a distinction 
between location and shape eects on the wage distributions following minimum 
wage changes. 
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
First, we assume the latent distributions of the log-transformed wages are well 
approximated by distributions belonging to the family of location-scale 
distributions, such that the latent distributions across economic sectors and 
provinces in Viet Nam only dier in terms of location and scale, but not in terms of 
their “shape” (see e.g., Rinne, 2014).15  Mathematically, we specify the latent wages (in 
logs) across location, economic sector and time as random variables with cumulative 
distribution functions given by
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4.1. The shape of local wage distributions and the impact of minimum 
wages
In the seminal paper describing the impact of minimum wages on the wage 
distributions across the US states, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) assume that 
the minimum wage has no spill-over eect to wages above the minimum wage level. 
By this assumption, the minimum wage can only aect the lower left tail of the 
distributions, and the wage distributions are expected to have sharp discontinuity 
points at the level of the minimum wage. Lee (1999) modies this restrictive 
identifying assumption by supposing, instead, that the minimum wage has no 
impact on the median wage and above, but only on wages below the median. Bosch 
and Manacorda (2010) use the same identifying assumption for wage distributions in 
Mexico, although they modify the assumption to state that the 70th percentile of the 
distributions are unaected by minimum wage changes.
For Viet Nam we cannot assume that high wages (say, the median wage and above) 
are unaected by minimum wage changes. The reason is that the minimum wage for 
the state sector determines not only the lowest wages but also higher wages 
because remunerations are set as multiplicative mark-ups on the minimum wage. 
Thus, we expect changes in the minimum wage in the state sector to automatically 
lead to (close to) proportional changes in almost all wages in the sector. Further, 
because of the size of the state sector in Viet Nam the wage setting in that sector is 
likely to have substantial spill-over eects to the other economic sectors, whereby 
even high wage employees in non-state enterprises may be aected by minimum 
wage changes in the state sector.
As we show below, under certain assumptions about the local wage distributions, 
the wage distribution regressions in Lee (1999), Bosch and Manacorda (2010) and 
Autor et al. (2016) actually allow for minimum wage eects across the whole wage 
distribution. We illustrate this by being very explicit in the formulation of the 
observed and the latent wage distributions (the distributions that would have 
prevailed without the changes in the minimum wages) and we make a distinction 
between location and shape eects on the wage distributions following minimum 
wage changes. 
15  The family of location scale distributions is quite large, and the distributions need not be symmetric. 
Examples of symmetric distributions are the normal, the logistic, and the Cauchy distributions. 
Examples of asymmetric distributions are the half-normal, the exponential, the Rayleigh, and the 
Maxwell–Boltzmann distributions. 
16  If, say, the latent wages were log-normally distributed then zp would be the quartiles of the standard 
normal distribution.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
where w* are the latent log-wages (i.e., the log-wages we would have observed had 
there been no changes in the minimum wages), F(∙) is a continuous cumulative 
density function having no other parameters and ajkt, bjkt are the location an scale 
parameters, respectively, that may vary across province (j), economic sector (k) and 
time (t). Given the distributional assumption, the quartile functions of the latent 
log-wages have a simple linear form
where w*jkt(p) is the p
th quartile (or percentile) of the latent log-wage distribution in 
province j, economic sector k at time t and zp is the p
th quartile of the parameter free 
distribution of the reduced latent log-wage variables.16 Unfortunately, neither 
w*jkt(p), aijk, bijk nor zp are observed.
For the observed log-wages we assume they are additively related to the latent 
log-wages and the minimum wages, where wjkt(p) is the pth quartile of the observed 
log-wage distribution in province j, economic sector k at time t, while wmjkt is the 
minimum wage in the same province, economic sector and year.
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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First, we assume the latent distributions of the log-transformed wages are well 
approximated by distributions belonging to the family of location-scale 
distributions, such that the latent distributions across economic sectors and 
provinces in Viet Nam only dier in terms of location and scale, but not in terms of 
their “shape” (see e.g., Rinne, 2014).15  Mathematically, we specify the latent wages (in 
logs) across location, economic sector and time as random variables with cumulative 
distribution functions given by
  −
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In this decomposition    is a province factor,      is an economic sector factor while     is 
a time factor. The four terms in parentheses are interactions of the three main factors, 
giving a complete linear decomposition of all quartile ranges of all the latent 
log-wage distributions. In the analysis, we specify the triple-interaction as
where     are averages of worker specic characteristics at the location, economic 
sector and time level that may inuence the scale parameter, while we treat ujkt,p as a 
disturbance term.
An important identifying assumption in Lee (1999) and Autor et al. (2016) is that the 
minimum wage aects the shape of the wage distribution through the “eective” 
minimum wage, specied as the dierence between the minimum log-wage and the 
median log-wage,                         . For the US data a quadratic specication of the 
eective minimum wage is needed, but as we show in the results section, for the 
Vietnamese data a linear specication appears more appropriate. Thus, we specify 
the shape eect of the minimum wage as
The important assumption in (3) is that the impact of the minimum wage can be 
decomposed into a location eect,                 , and a shape eect,                       . The location 
eect is (naturally) assumed to be constant within a given distribution while it may 
vary across distributions, say between the state sector (in which the elasticity,  jkt, is 
close to one) and the private sector (having a lower elasticity). In contrast, the shape 
eect is expected to vary by quartile while we assume it is common across 
distributions. Given these assumptions we can estimate the impact of the minimum 
wage on the shape of the distributions by looking at the dierence between two 
quartiles, say the pth and the median (p = 50)
As zp and z50 are (unknown) constants the quartile ranges can be linearly 
decomposed along the three dimensions
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While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
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Finally, an assumption that identies the shape impact is that the minimum wage has 
no shape eect around the median
Inserting equations (5) to (8) in (4) we obtain a regression model that can estimate 
the shape impact of the minimum wage on the local wage distributions in Viet Nam
4.2. The Data
We use the Vietnamese Labour Force Survey (LFS) data collected by the Viet Nam 
General Statistics Oce (GSO). The sampling frame of the LFS is the 2009 Population 
and Housing Census. Enumeration areas are re-sampled every two years whereby 
the areas surveyed in 2011 are dierent from those surveyed in 2012 and 2013. 
Individuals are sampled on a monthly basis providing quarterly indicators on 
employment status, wages, and several other socioeconomic factors. Individuals 
within each quarter are partly resampled to form a rotating panel and the survey is 
designed to be representative at the province level over a full year.17  We do not make 
direct use of the panel structure, but we do take it into account in the regression 
analyses.
After inspecting and cleaning the data to ensure consistency over time, we have a 
sample of 1,966,864 observations distributed over four quarters in each year. Of 
these, only about 26 per cent (518,565) are wage workers. Details on the data 
cleaning procedure are given in Appendix A. Table A1 in Appendix B illustrates that 
our data cleaning has a negligible inuence on the estimated employment in Viet 
Nam, both in terms of total numbers and in terms of composition. Our employment 
estimates are about 200 thousand people below the ocial estimates, which is less 
than 0.5 per cent of the employment estimates in each of the three years. 
Furthermore, the estimated composition of the employed population is equal to the 
ocial estimates to the rst decimal point in terms of sex, residence, economic 
sector, and employment status.
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17   The sampling design and main ndings are documented in the annual LFS reports (General Statistics 
Oce, 2012, 2013, and 2014)
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
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We use the information about hours worked to adjust the reported monthly wage 
according to a 48 hour workweek (Labour Code, 2012). We deate the wages 
reported in the surveys using provincial consumer price indices based on household 
expenditure data on food and non-food items obtained from the Viet Nam 
Household Living Standards Survey (GSO, 2010). Our reference province is Ho Chi 
Minh City (HCMC) and the base year is 2010. Overall, the estimated average real wage 
is VND3 million per month. Between 2011 and 2013, the estimated average real wage 
increased from VND2.7 million to VND3.1 million. This is in accordance with the 
gures reported by the ILO (2014).
As noted, the minimum wage legislation is only legally binding for enterprises and 
workers in the formal sector. Unfortunately, there is no direct information about 
formality of the enterprises at which individuals are employed in the LFS surveys. 
Therefore, to classify workers into formal and informal employment we use 
information from the 2013 LFS about the current workplace having a business 
registration certicate, tax code, social insurance registration and written accounts.18  
Table A2 in Appendix B shows that rms who do not possess all four of these legal 
documents that are necessary for formal operation are operating in the agriculture or 
the household production sector, whereas the vast majority of rms in the private, 
state or foreign investment sectors have all four certicates. This consistent overlap 
between economic sector and formality allows us to use the sector denition in 2011 
and 2012 to classify employed workers as working in formal or informal enterprises 
for all three years.19 Thus, in the following we assume that minimum wage 
legislations are legally binding for all wage workers in the private sector, the state 
sector, and the foreign investment sector, while the legislations are not binding for 
wage workers in the agricultural sector or the household production sector. Using 
this simple, direct classication of formal and informal employment we nd that 62 
per cent of the wage workers are in formal employment.
Minimum wage non-compliance is fairly common in the formal sector, and we nd 
an increase in non-compliance from 5 per cent in 2011 to 8 per cent in 2012 and 9 per 
cent in 2013.20 Across the three economic sectors, non-compliance is highest for 
workers in FIEs (13 per cent in 2013) while it is almost the same rate for state sector 
and private sector wage workers as the private sector has just above 9 per cent while 
the state sector has just below 9 per cent non-compliance in 2013.
4.2. The Data
We use the Vietnamese Labour Force Survey (LFS) data collected by the Viet Nam 
General Statistics Oce (GSO). The sampling frame of the LFS is the 2009 Population 
and Housing Census. Enumeration areas are re-sampled every two years whereby 
the areas surveyed in 2011 are dierent from those surveyed in 2012 and 2013. 
Individuals are sampled on a monthly basis providing quarterly indicators on 
employment status, wages, and several other socioeconomic factors. Individuals 
within each quarter are partly resampled to form a rotating panel and the survey is 
designed to be representative at the province level over a full year.17  We do not make 
direct use of the panel structure, but we do take it into account in the regression 
analyses.
After inspecting and cleaning the data to ensure consistency over time, we have a 
sample of 1,966,864 observations distributed over four quarters in each year. Of 
these, only about 26 per cent (518,565) are wage workers. Details on the data 
cleaning procedure are given in Appendix A. Table A1 in Appendix B illustrates that 
our data cleaning has a negligible inuence on the estimated employment in Viet 
Nam, both in terms of total numbers and in terms of composition. Our employment 
estimates are about 200 thousand people below the ocial estimates, which is less 
than 0.5 per cent of the employment estimates in each of the three years. 
Furthermore, the estimated composition of the employed population is equal to the 
ocial estimates to the rst decimal point in terms of sex, residence, economic 
sector, and employment status.
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18    In 2011 and 2012 the response rate on business registration certicate, tax code, social insurance 
registration and written accounts was extremely low, which is why we rely on the 2013 information 
along these variables.
19    This categorization of the formal/informal sector is largely in accordance with ILO’s denition (2003) 
based on the characteristics of the production unit. 
20   The non-compliance rates are estimated as the (survey weighted) share of employed wage workers 
in the three sectors, state, private and foreign who reported wages below the relevant minimum wage. 
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
We use the information about hours worked to adjust the reported monthly wage 
according to a 48 hour workweek (Labour Code, 2012). We deate the wages 
reported in the surveys using provincial consumer price indices based on household 
expenditure data on food and non-food items obtained from the Viet Nam 
Household Living Standards Survey (GSO, 2010). Our reference province is Ho Chi 
Minh City (HCMC) and the base year is 2010. Overall, the estimated average real wage 
is VND3 million per month. Between 2011 and 2013, the estimated average real wage 
increased from VND2.7 million to VND3.1 million. This is in accordance with the 
gures reported by the ILO (2014).
As noted, the minimum wage legislation is only legally binding for enterprises and 
workers in the formal sector. Unfortunately, there is no direct information about 
formality of the enterprises at which individuals are employed in the LFS surveys. 
Therefore, to classify workers into formal and informal employment we use 
information from the 2013 LFS about the current workplace having a business 
registration certicate, tax code, social insurance registration and written accounts.18  
Table A2 in Appendix B shows that rms who do not possess all four of these legal 
documents that are necessary for formal operation are operating in the agriculture or 
the household production sector, whereas the vast majority of rms in the private, 
state or foreign investment sectors have all four certicates. This consistent overlap 
between economic sector and formality allows us to use the sector denition in 2011 
and 2012 to classify employed workers as working in formal or informal enterprises 
for all three years.19 Thus, in the following we assume that minimum wage 
legislations are legally binding for all wage workers in the private sector, the state 
sector, and the foreign investment sector, while the legislations are not binding for 
wage workers in the agricultural sector or the household production sector. Using 
this simple, direct classication of formal and informal employment we nd that 62 
per cent of the wage workers are in formal employment.
Minimum wage non-compliance is fairly common in the formal sector, and we nd 
an increase in non-compliance from 5 per cent in 2011 to 8 per cent in 2012 and 9 per 
cent in 2013.20 Across the three economic sectors, non-compliance is highest for 
workers in FIEs (13 per cent in 2013) while it is almost the same rate for state sector 
and private sector wage workers as the private sector has just above 9 per cent while 
the state sector has just below 9 per cent non-compliance in 2013.
4.2. The Data
We use the Vietnamese Labour Force Survey (LFS) data collected by the Viet Nam 
General Statistics Oce (GSO). The sampling frame of the LFS is the 2009 Population 
and Housing Census. Enumeration areas are re-sampled every two years whereby 
the areas surveyed in 2011 are dierent from those surveyed in 2012 and 2013. 
Individuals are sampled on a monthly basis providing quarterly indicators on 
employment status, wages, and several other socioeconomic factors. Individuals 
within each quarter are partly resampled to form a rotating panel and the survey is 
designed to be representative at the province level over a full year.17  We do not make 
direct use of the panel structure, but we do take it into account in the regression 
analyses.
After inspecting and cleaning the data to ensure consistency over time, we have a 
sample of 1,966,864 observations distributed over four quarters in each year. Of 
these, only about 26 per cent (518,565) are wage workers. Details on the data 
cleaning procedure are given in Appendix A. Table A1 in Appendix B illustrates that 
our data cleaning has a negligible inuence on the estimated employment in Viet 
Nam, both in terms of total numbers and in terms of composition. Our employment 
estimates are about 200 thousand people below the ocial estimates, which is less 
than 0.5 per cent of the employment estimates in each of the three years. 
Furthermore, the estimated composition of the employed population is equal to the 
ocial estimates to the rst decimal point in terms of sex, residence, economic 
sector, and employment status.
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While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
We use the information about hours worked to adjust the reported monthly wage 
according to a 48 hour workweek (Labour Code, 2012). We deate the wages 
reported in the surveys using provincial consumer price indices based on household 
expenditure data on food and non-food items obtained from the Viet Nam 
Household Living Standards Survey (GSO, 2010). Our reference province is Ho Chi 
Minh City (HCMC) and the base year is 2010. Overall, the estimated average real wage 
is VND3 million per month. Between 2011 and 2013, the estimated average real wage 
increased from VND2.7 million to VND3.1 million. This is in accordance with the 
gures reported by the ILO (2014).
As noted, the minimum wage legislation is only legally binding for enterprises and 
workers in the formal sector. Unfortunately, there is no direct information about 
formality of the enterprises at which individuals are employed in the LFS surveys. 
Therefore, to classify workers into formal and informal employment we use 
information from the 2013 LFS about the current workplace having a business 
registration certicate, tax code, social insurance registration and written accounts.18  
Table A2 in Appendix B shows that rms who do not possess all four of these legal 
documents that are necessary for formal operation are operating in the agriculture or 
the household production sector, whereas the vast majority of rms in the private, 
state or foreign investment sectors have all four certicates. This consistent overlap 
between economic sector and formality allows us to use the sector denition in 2011 
and 2012 to classify employed workers as working in formal or informal enterprises 
for all three years.19 Thus, in the following we assume that minimum wage 
legislations are legally binding for all wage workers in the private sector, the state 
sector, and the foreign investment sector, while the legislations are not binding for 
wage workers in the agricultural sector or the household production sector. Using 
this simple, direct classication of formal and informal employment we nd that 62 
per cent of the wage workers are in formal employment.
Minimum wage non-compliance is fairly common in the formal sector, and we nd 
an increase in non-compliance from 5 per cent in 2011 to 8 per cent in 2012 and 9 per 
cent in 2013.20 Across the three economic sectors, non-compliance is highest for 
workers in FIEs (13 per cent in 2013) while it is almost the same rate for state sector 
and private sector wage workers as the private sector has just above 9 per cent while 
the state sector has just below 9 per cent non-compliance in 2013.
The degree of non-compliance can also be seen from Figure 1 in which we show 
log-wage distributions by year and sector in which the individual log-wages are 
normalized by subtraction of the relevant minimum log-wage. In 2011 the minimum 
wage appears to have little inuence on the tail distributions for the wages in the 
private and the state sector while the lower tail of the log-wage distribution for 
foreign investment enterprises appear compressed despite the larger fraction on 
wages below the (higher) minimum wage. Moving to 2012 and 2013 we observe a 
change in the lower tails of the distributions as there appears to be a compression 
around the minimum wages, despite the relative increase in non-compliance. In 
particular for wages in the foreign investment sector there is a substantial 
compression just at and above the minimum wage. This compression is also, to a 
much lesser extent though, visible for the wages in the private and the state sector.
Figure 1: Distributions of log-wages normalized by log-minimum wages, by 
                   time and economic sector
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2013, Private 2013, State 2013, Foreign investment
Note: The plots are histograms of individual log-wages less the relevant minimum log-wage based on year, 
economic sector and province. Kernel density estimates are superimposed on the histograms.
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5  Empirical results
5.1. The impact of minimum wage changes on local wage distributions in 
the formal sector
Using individual wage observations from the LFSs we generate log-wage 
distributions by province, economic sector and year, applying the LFS sampling 
weights to compute the local distributions. Having three years, three economic 
sectors and 63 provinces/cities, there are potentially 567 local wage distributions. 
However, in order to have meaningful data we only generate distributions if a 
year/sector/province combination has a sample of at least 100 individual 
observations. Since several of the local labour markets do not full this requirement 
we end up having 444 local wage distributions. The “missing” distributions are, apart 
from one, all from the foreign investment sector. This is to be expected given the 
relatively small size, and geographical concentration, of that economic sector.
While the large increases from 2011 to 2012 are caused by the alignment of 
minimum wages across economic sectors, the increases from 2012 to 2013 are 
related to a change from a government-led system to a more collective bargaining 
system.13 The complexity of managing multilevel systems is exacerbated in low 
enforcement capacity environments such as Viet Nam where labour inspections, as 
one of the means to ensure compliance, tend to be the exception rather than the 
rule.14 In fact, in 2012, an auditing process across Vietnamese manufacturing rms 
found that about 33 per cent of rms had violations related to wages and benets 
(Del Carpio and Pabon, 2014). Under weak enforcement, employers may prefer to 
hire a mixed workforce, where some workers receive the mandated minimum wage 
rate and others less, either informally or through contracting.
Figure 2:  Local wage distributions, by year, economic sector and province
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Figure 2 plots the 444 local wage distributions by year, economic sector, and 
province. Each line in the nine plots represents the empirical cumulated density 
function of a local log-wage distribution. The percentiles are given along the second 
axis (from 5 to 90 per cent) while the rst axis gives the real log-wage. We have 
subtracted the relevant real minimum log-wage from all real log-wages to show the 
wage levels relative to the relevant minimum wage. The plots therefore also illustrate 
the degree of non-compliance in local labour markets. Several local distributions 
have a lower tail with wages below the minimum wage in all three economic sectors 
and the number of distributions increases from 2011 to 2012 in accordance with the 
individual data, as illustrated in Figure 1. Moreover, in 2012 and 2013 we nd wages 
below the minimum wage for percentiles up to 20 per cent in the private and state 
sectors and for even higher percentiles in the foreign investment sector. This 
illustrates that non-compliance is not concentrated in a few provinces. Finally, Figure 
2 also illustrates that the median wages in all local labour markets in the formal 
sector are above the relevant minimum wage.
Figure 3: Eective minimum log-wages, by year, economic sector, and province
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21     In addition to the time, economic sector and province xed factors we also condition on gender 
(share of female workers), average age, share of minority workers, share of urban workers, level of 
education (11 education categories), degree of worker tenure (4 tenure categories) and type of 
occupation (10 occupation categories).
Figure 3 gives histograms of the eective minimum log-wage (the minimum 
log-wage less the median log-wage) across years, economic sectors and provinces. 
This is the central explanatory variable in the analysis. The increase in the eective 
minimum wage is clearly visible for the private sector and the state sector while the 
increase is much smaller in the foreign investment sector. It should be noted, 
however, that when we estimate the eect of the minimum wage change we 
condition on time, economic sector, and province xed eects, including their 
interactions. This means that a very large fraction of the variation in the eective 
minimum wages is controlled for. The transformation of the eective minimum wage 
is illustrated in Figure 4 in which we present histograms of the eective minimum 
wage, conditional on xed factors and the other covariates.21 Figures 3 and 4 are 
comparable and the scale shows that the range (and variance) of the eective 
minimum log-wages is reduced by a factor of 10. Further, Figures 3 and 4 show that 
the two extreme observations in the foreign investment sector in 2011 (also visible in 
Figure 2) appear well accounted for by the xed factors.
Figure 4: Eective minimum wages conditional on xed factors and additional 
                   controls, by year, economic sector, and province
















log(minimum real wage)-log(median real wage) conditional on xed factors
2011, Private 2011, State 2011, Foreign investment
2012, Private 2012, State 2012, Foreign investment
2013, Private 2013, State 2013, Foreign investment
32 The impact of minimum wage adjustments on Vietnamese wage inequality
Table 2 reports the estimated marginal eects of the eective minimum wages on 
selected quartiles of the local log-wage distributions while Figure 5 shows the 
estimated marginal eects by 1 percentage point intervals from the 5 per cent to the 
90 per cent quartile. The regressions are as given in equation (9) and we report results 
of both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (TSLS) regressions. 
We include the TSLS regressions because Autor et al. (2016) convincingly argue that 
the eective minimum log-wage may have measurement errors induced by the 
subtraction of the median real log-wage. In the TSLS regressions the minimum real 
wages (summarized in Table 1), interacted with province dummies, are used as 
instruments for the eective minimum wages.
Table 2: Estimated impact of eective minimum wages on local wage 
                 distributions in the formal sector
OLS TSLS
























































Note: All regressions include province, economic sector and time xed eects and the two-way interactions of 
the three xed eects. The regressions also include controls for labor force composition in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, education, tenure and type of occupation. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, spatial 
and temporal clustering. *** Signicant at the 1 per cent level; ** Signicant at the 5 per cent level; * Signicant 
at the 10 per cent level. 
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The OLS estimates are positive, fairly large and signicant for the lower half of the 
local log-wage distributions, yet generally insignicant for the upper part, indicating 
reduced local wage inequality. The TSLS estimates are slightly larger than the 
corresponding OLS estimates in the lower part of the distributions but, 
unsurprisingly, with larger standard errors. In the upper part of the distributions the 
TSLS point estimates are generally negative and clearly statistically insignicant. The 
larger TSLS point estimates in the lower part of the distributions are somewhat 
surprising considering that the instrumental variable estimation is expected to 
overcome a positive measurement error bias. In the upper part of the distribution, 
the OLS and TSLS results are in accordance with expectations.
Figure 5: Estimated eects of eective minimum wages on local wage 
                   distributions
Note: The lines are point estimates, by 1 percentage intervals (5 – 90 per cent). The dashed lines are upper and 
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34 The impact of minimum wage adjustments on Vietnamese wage inequality
Note: All regressions include province, economic sector and time xed eects and the two-way interactions of 
the three xed eects. The regressions also include controls for labor force composition in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, education, tenure and type of occupation. The marginal eect is evaluated at an eective minimum 
log-wage of -0.9, which is the average level across sectors and provinces in 2011. The column "Joint 
Signicance" gives the p-values of Wald tests of joint signicance of the linear and squared terms. Standard 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, spatial and temporal clustering. *** Signicant at the 1 per cent level; ** 
































































































































Estimated impact of eective minimum wages on local wage 
distributions in the formal sector using a quadratic function for the shape 
eect of the eective minimum wage
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22     Partial scatter plots for other quartiles give similar results. 
The results could possibly be driven by a misspecication of the functional form. 
Specically, both Lee (1999) and Autor et al. (2016) model the shape eect using a 
quadratic form for the eective minimum wage while we use a linear specication. To 
illustrate that our results are not driven by such a functional form misspecication, 
Table 3 reports estimated marginal eects from regression models using quadratic 
forms for the same subset of quantiles as given in Table 2 with OLS estimates in Panel 
A and TSLS estimates in Panel B. The quadratic specication gives the same pattern of 
estimated marginal eects but the eects, evaluated at an eective minimum 
log-wage of -0.92 (the average over economic sectors and provinces in 2011) appear 
excessive. Furthermore, the quadratic term is insignicant at conventional levels of 
signicance for almost all quartiles.
In Figure 6 we illustrate the association between the eective minimum wage and 
the ten per cent real log-wage quartile in a partial scatter plot in which the xed 
factors and other co-variates have been conditioned upon. The regression line in 
Figure 5 is the marginal eect estimated by OLS as given in Table 2 and the individual 
observations are given economic sector indicators (P = Private, S = State, F = Foreign 
investment) and year indicators (11 = 2011, 12 = 2012, 13 = 2013). The partial scatter 
plot gives no indication of a non-linear association, thus supporting our linear 
specication.22  Furthermore, there are no signs of major sector or year clusters.
Note: Observation markers indicate economic sector (P = private, S = state, F = foreign investment) and year (11 
= 2011, 12 = 2012, 13 = 2013). The regression line is the OLS regression.  
Figure 6: Estimated impact of the eective minimum wage on the 10th 
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36 The impact of minimum wage adjustments on Vietnamese wage inequality
In sum, we nd the minimum wage changes to have had a signicant statistical and 
economic impact on local wage distributions for workers employed in the formal 
sector. It is interesting to note that the impact is largest for the lowest segments of 
the distributions, indicating that increasing non-compliance does not imply that 
minimum wage changes have no impact on the lowest wages.
5.2. The impact of minimum wage changes on local wage distributions in 
the informal sector
We also generate local wage distributions for the two informal economic sectors 
consisting of workers in agriculture and in the household production sector. 
Applying the criterion of having at least 100 individual observations underlying each 
local wage distribution we have a sample of 342 local distributions (out of 378 
possible distributions). The missing distributions are predominantly for workers in 
agriculture.
Figure 7: Local wage distributions in the informal sector, by year, economic 
sector, and province
2011, Agriculture 2011, Household production
2012, Agriculture 2012, Household production
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The local log-wage distributions for the two sectors, in which we have subtracted the 
formal private sector minimum log-wage from each observation, are given in Figure 
7. That gure is directly comparable to Figure 2 and the dierences are clearly visible: 
low wages are relatively more prevalent in the informal sectors and the local wage 
dispersion is larger in the two informal private sectors compared with the formal 
private sector. Furthermore, for several of the local distributions the median wage is 
below the minimum wage in 2012 and 2013. However, the 60 per cent quartile is 
larger than the minimum wage in all distributions. We use this observation to 
construct an eective minimum wage for the informal sector as the real minimum 
log-wage for the formal private sector less the 60th percentile log-wage in the local 
distributions. That is, we assume that the shape eect of the minimum wage is zero 
for the 60 per cent quartile, while the location eect may be dierent from zero.  
Histograms of the eective minimum log-wage for the informal sector are given in 
Figure 8. The pattern over time of the eective minimum wage in the informal sector 
indicates a somewhat smaller change in the location of the distributions compared 
to the formal sector, but this does not indicate anything about the possible impact 
on the shape of the distributions.
Figure 8: Eective minimum log-wages for the informal sector, by year, 
economic sector, and province
2011, Agriculture 2011, Household production
2012, Agriculture 2012, Household production
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In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 
56% of the median wage in both years.
If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
The estimated impact on the shape is reported in Table 4 and Figure 9. As for the 
formal sector analysis, we report point estimates for selected quartiles (Table 4) and 
estimated marginal eects by 1 percentage point intervals from the 5 per cent to the 
90 per cent quartile (Figure 9).
Table 4: Estimated impact of eective minimum wages on local wage 































































Note: All regressions include province, economic sector and time xed eects and the two-way interactions of 
the three xed eects. The regressions also include controls for labor force composition in terms of age, gender, 
ethnicity, education, tenure and type of occupation. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, spatial 
and temporal clustering. *** Signicant at the 1 per cent level; ** Signicant at the 5 per cent level; * Signicant 
at the 10 per cent level.
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In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 
56% of the median wage in both years.
If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
Figure 9: Estimated eects of eective minimum wages on local wage 
distributions in the informal sector
2011, Household production
Note: The lines are point estimates, by 1 percentage intervals (5 – 90 per cent). The dashed lines are upper and 
lower 95% point-wise condence intervals. 
The OLS estimates show a fairly large and signicant eect for the 5 per cent quartile, 
but insignicant results for all other quartiles in the lower tail (below w(60)). The large 
impact on the 5 per cent quartile is not conrmed by the TSLS regression, instead we 
nd a statistically signicant impact around the 40 per cent quartile. However, we 
think it is fair to conclude that the eective minimum wages in all likelihood has no 
systematic impact on the lower part of the local wage distributions in the informal 
sector. 
In contrast, both estimators show a signicant positive impact on the upper tail of the 
distributions, roughly from the 70 per cent quartile and upwards (to the 90th which is 
the upper most quartile we have included). The eect size is almost of the same order 
of magnitude as the impact on the lower tail quartiles in the formal sector. One 
possible interpretation of the result is that worker mobility between the formal and 
the informal sectors is larger for the relatively high wage workers in the informal 
sectors whereas the low wage workers in these sectors do not compete with low 
wage workers in the formal sectors. Unfortunately, our LFS data does not permit us to 




















jks ),  t = 2012, 2013; s = 2011 (10)
40 The impact of minimum wage adjustments on Vietnamese wage inequality
5.3. The impact of minimum wage changes on economy wide wage 
distributions
We use the estimated parameters from the local log-wage distributions to compute 
counterfactual estimates of the impact of the minimum wage changes on the 
national wage distributions. Following Lee (1999) we estimate counterfactual 
individual wages by adjusting for minimum wage changes from 2011 to 2012 and 
from 2011 to 2013. Specically, we rank all individual observations according to the 
local percentile distributions within each year. We adjust the observed wage for 
individual i in province j, economic sector k, and year t,      , by subtracting the 
estimated impact of the actual minimum wage and adding the estimated impact of 
the minimum wage as it was in 2011:
We have two sets of impact estimates, using either the OLS or the TSLS coecients, 
shown in Figures 5 and 9, and we estimate counterfactual individual wages using 
both sets of estimates.
The counterfactual wages estimated from (10) only include the shape eect of the 
minimum wages. As discussed in Section 4.1, the minimum wages also have a 
location eect such that the total eect of minimum wage changes may be dierent 
from the estimate in (10). Therefore we can estimate a total eect of the minimum 
changes as follows. First, notice that the change over time in the median log-wage is 
given by:
Here each term on the RHS represents the change over time in certain parts of the 
local log-wage distributions. The term in the rst parenthesis is the pure location 
shift, covering general changes in productivity. The second term is the change over 
time in the dispersion parameter while third term is the change over time in the 
impact of a given minimum wage. If the rst three terms are small relative to the 
minimum wage change (the fourth term), then the change in the median wage is a 
good estimator of the impact of the minimum wage change on the location of the 
wages. As the changes in the minimum wages were substantial from 2011 to 2012 
(and 2013) while this short period probably had more limited changes in labour 
productivity and other location/scale changing factors, we believe the changes over 
 ijktw
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time in median wages over this short period are dominated by the location eect of 
the minimum wage changes. Thus, subtracting the median log-wage dierence from 
the RHS of equation (10) we get an estimate of the total eect of the minimum wage 
changes from 2011:
In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 
56% of the median wage in both years.
If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
(12)
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Here each term on the RHS represents the change over time in certain parts of the 
local log-wage distributions. The term in the rst parenthesis is the pure location 
shift, covering general changes in productivity. The second term is the change over 
time in the dispersion parameter while third term is the change over time in the 
impact of a given minimum wage. If the rst three terms are small relative to the 
minimum wage change (the fourth term), then the change in the median wage is a 
good estimator of the impact of the minimum wage change on the location of the 
wages. As the changes in the minimum wages were substantial from 2011 to 2012 
(and 2013) while this short period probably had more limited changes in labour 
productivity and other location/scale changing factors, we believe the changes over 23     For the informal sectors we use the 60 per cent quartiles instead of the medians to estimate the 
location eect of the minimum wages. 
(50) (50) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 2012,2013; 2011
time in median wages over this short period are dominated by the location eect of 
the minimum wage changes. Thus, subtracting the median log-wage dierence from 
the RHS of equation (10) we get an estimate of the total eect of the minimum wage 
changes from 2011:
Using the OLS and TSLS coecients, we can now estimate four sets of counterfactual 
individual wages: Using equation (10) we only take account of the shape eect of the 
minimum wage change, while  applying equation (12) we get total eects—possibly 
confounding the location eect with other local distribution location eects, 
though.23
In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 
56% of the median wage in both years.




jkt ) - (wjks(50)- wjkt(50) ) ,  








jks ) ,    t = 2012, 2013; s = 2011
 β
β θ
− − − −
≈ − − − − =
ˆ( ) ( ) ( (50) (50))
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ), , 13; 20 1
c m m
ijktijkt p jkt jks jkt jks
m m
ijkt p jkt jks jks jkt jks
p w
w w t s
 β
β θ
= − − − −
≈ − − − − =
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) (50) (50 )
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ), 2012,2013; 2011
c m m
ij tijkt p jkt jks jkt jks
m m m m
ijkt jkt jks jks jkt jks
p p w
p w w t s 
β θ
=
≈ − − − − = =
ˆ( ) ) ) ( (50) (50))
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ), 2012,2013; 2011
c
ijktijkt p jkt jks jkt jks
m m m m
ijkt p jkt jks jks jkt jks
w p w
w p w w w w t s
 β
β θ
= − − − −
≈ − − − − = =
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( (50) (50))
ˆ( ) ( ) ), 201 ,2013; 20 1
c m m
ijktijkt p jkt jks jkt jks
m m
ijkt p jkt jks jks jkt jks
w p w p w w w w
w p w w t s
If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
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In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 



















































































If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
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We use the four sets of counterfactual wage estimates to generate 24 counterfactual 
national wage distributions, 12 distributions for each of the years 2012 and 2013 
covering (i) formal sector wage employment, (ii) informal sector wage employment, 
and (iii) all wage employment. In Table 5 we report summary inequality statistics in 
the form of estimated Gini coecients (Panel A) and coecients of variation (Panel 
B). All estimates are based on wage measures at the individual level that are 
summarized using the original survey weights. Thus, the summary statistics are 
estimates of actual and counterfactual national measures.
As expected, the actual LFS data show that wage inequality is somewhat higher in 
the formal sectors compared to the informal sectors. But, at the same time it is 
interesting to note that the overall wage inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coecient and the coecient of variation, is close to the level of inequality in the 
formal sectors. Furthermore, we nd almost no change in actual wage inequality 
from 2012 to 2013.
Comparing the actual inequality estimates to the counterfactual estimates we nd 
that in the absence of the minimum wage changes from 2011 onwards, wage 
inequality would have been higher in the formal sectors (by around 2.5 Gini 
percentage points), but lower in the informal sector (by about 2 Gini percentage 
points). This result is to be expected, given the regression results for the local wage 
distributions. In addition, Table 5 shows that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has 
little qualitative impact on the result and also that the estimated total eect is close 
to the estimated shape eect for the formal sectors, while there is a slightly larger 
dierence between the two eects for the informal sectors. We also nd that the 
minimum wage changes have decreased overall wage inequality by about 2 Gini 
percentage points. This is quite a substantial dierence in wage inequality. The 
coecients of variation, given in Panel B of Table 5 conrms the conclusions 
obtained from the Gini coecients, showing a completely parallel pattern of impacts 
on wage inequality.
In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 
56% of the median wage in both years.
If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
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and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
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Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
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In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 
56% of the median wage in both years.
Figure 10:  Percentile ratios (P(x)/P(50)) of actual and counterfactual national 
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If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
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In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 
56% of the median wage in both years.
If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
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6 Conclusion
Under central planning, the Vietnamese Government purposely maintained an 
egalitarian income distribution. But from the time of the initiation of reforms (doi 
moi) in 1986 and subsequent restructuring of the state sector wage system, 
remuneration of both (domestic) state and private sector workers has, in theory, 
been left to market forces. As such and in the context of growing global competition 
one of the objectives of the minimum wage is to protect the incomes of the most 
vulnerable workers. Although real wages have been growing steadily, with the 
exception of a slight dip following the economic crisis, there is also evidence of rising 
income inequality both along the rural/urban divide and within localities. However, 
solid evidence on the extent to which the imposed wage oor has had any 
distributional impact remains limited. In this paper, we set out to estimate the eect 
of changes in (real) minimum wages on the shape of the income distribution using 
Vietnamese Labour Force Survey data from 2011-2013, a period during which 
minimum wage increases were particularly high, due mainly to the merging of 
minimum wage rates applied to domestic and foreign rms in 2012.
We nd that minimum wages have reduced wage inequality in the formal sectors by 
increasing the wages at the lower end of the distribution while it has increased wage 
inequality in the informal sectors by increasing the wages at the upper end of the 
distribution. The overall eect has been a signicant decrease in wage inequality, 
though.
Focussing on the impact on wages at the lower end of the distributions we nd that 
the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 56 per cent of the median wage 
in 2012 and 2013. We estimate that these ratios would have been as low as 50 per 
cent, had there been no change in the minimum wages from 2011, onwards. This is a 
substantial dierence. Furthermore, the impact is noticeable also at the 20th 
percentile, as the dierence between the actual and the counterfactual distributions 
is around 3-6 percentage point. The impact of minimum wage changes thus appear 
to aect wages both below and above the minimum wage level in Viet Nam, 
indicating (i) that non-compliance does not imply non-impact and (ii) that 
substantial spill-over eects are present in the Vietnamese labour markets.
In Table 6 and Figure 10 we focus on the lower part of the national wage 
distributions, by concentrating on quartile ratios (in per cent). For example, 
P(10)/P(50) is the 10/50 wage ratio, giving the wage level at the bottom 10th per cent 
divided by the median wage (in per cent). As seen in Table 6, in 2012 the national 10/ 
50 wage ratio covering all sectors was 56 per cent while it decreased (ever so slightly) 
to 55.9 per cent in 2013. Thus, the wage level at the bottom 10 per cent was around 
56% of the median wage in both years.
If there had been no change in the minimum wages from 2011 to 2012 and 2013, we 
estimate that the ratio would have been as low as 46-48 per cent in the formal sector, 
depending on the specic estimate. This is a substantial dierence (8-10 percentage 
points) illustrating that the minimum wage changes have had a marked impact on 
the lower part of the national formal sector wage distribution. Table 5 and Figure 10, 
in which the counterfactual distributions are given by 5 percentage point intervals, 
both show that the choice of estimator (OLS or TSLS) has little impact on the result 
and also that the estimated total eect is close to the estimated shape eect. Thus, 
regardless of the choice of estimator we obtain results that are, economically, of the 
same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
the impact is noticeable also at the 20 per cent quartile, as the dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual distributions is around 5-8 percentage point.
For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
dierence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
inequality, by comparing the lower tail to the median wage level, both the nominator 
and the denominator changes when we compare wage inequality in the formal 
sector and all sectors. Overall, we thus nd that the minimum wage changes from 
2011 to 2012 and 2013 had a noticeable impact in terms of substantially decreasing 
the national wage inequality and the decrease in inequality mainly came about from 
increases in the lower part of the wage distribution. Still, the minimum wage changes 
did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
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ect. Thus, 
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same order of magnitude, and the order of magnitude is substantial. Furthermore, 
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erence between 
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For the informal sectors the results are quite dierent as we nd virtually no change 
in the lower part of the wage distributions in 2012 and 2013 (see Panel B in Table 6 
and middle section of Figure 10). Thus, the increase inequality noticed in Table 5 
comes about from higher counterfactual wages in the upper part of the national 
distribution. 
Finally, looking at the actual and counterfactual wage distributions for all sectors in 
Panel C of Table 5 and the lower part of Figure 10, we get results that are quite similar 
to the formal sector. Compared to the 8-10 percentage points dierence between 
the actual and the counterfactual 10/50 ratio for formal sector wages we nd a 
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erence around 5-7 percentage points when looking at wages in all sectors. As the 
informal sectors account for some 38 per cent of the wage workers in Viet Nam the 
result is slightly surprising. However, the overall dierence in the wage levels 
between the formal and the informal sectors has a fairly large impact on the median 
wage levels. The median real wage in the formal sector is VND2.971 million in 2012 
while it is only VND2.288 million (more than 20 per cent lower) in the informal sector. 
The overall median real wage is VND2.654 million, thus when we look at wage 
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did, in all likelihood, not increase the low wages in the informal sector.
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The impact of minimum wage adjustments
on Vietnamese wage inequality
In line with the global trends, Viet Nam has seen major improvements in its minimum wage 
policy and system in recent years. Before 2012, Vietnam’s had a two tier system with diering 
minimum wage rates for domestic enterprises and foreign enterprises, which were xed by 
the government. The establishment of the tripartite National Wage Council in 2013 has 
transformed Vietnam’s minimum wage system by merging two minimum wage rates into a 
single rate with regional dierentiation as well as providing for tripartite participation in 
developing minimum wage recommendations.
This working paper is timely, as there is a growing need to examine the impact of minimum 
wages on the labour market. In this publication, the authors highlight the impact of minimum 
wage changes in the distribution of wages in the informal and other sectors. In this respect, 
an improvement in income distribution for a large proportion of the employed population is 
emerging. However, due to some structural characteristics in the rural sector as well in 
household production, the “light-house” eect of the minimum wage that is evident in 





ILO Country oce for Viet Nam
Address: 48-50 Nguyen Thai Hoc, Ba Dinh, Hanoi
Tel No: 84 4 37340902
Fax: 84 4 37340904
